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JURISDICTION

On October 7, 2016, the district court entered a judgment on
special verdict in favor of the District and against Gaston.
On October 25, 2016, Gaston filed a Notice of Appeal.

R. 613-15.

R. 619.

Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to this Court.

The

R. 625, 629.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE
~

ANN. § 78A-4-103(j).

~

~

1
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ISSUES PRESENTED

Gaston's appeal presents two main issues:
1.

Challenges for cause
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying

Gaston's for-cause challenges to five prospective jurors, where the
district court observed each juror's demeanor, and the entirety of the
voir dire exchange showed that each of them could be fair and
impartial, would follow the law, and could render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court?

a.

Standard of review

"[This Court] review[s] a trial court's determination whether to
remove a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion." State v. Calliham,
2002 UT 86,

ii 47, 55 P.3d 573 (citation omitted); accord Harding v.

Bell, 2002 UT 108,

iJ 14, 57 P.3d 1093 ("A trial court's determination of

whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause should not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion." (quotation omitted)).

2
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b.

Preservation of issue

The parties preserved this issue in the voir dire hearing before the
district court.
2.
~

See R. 631-771.

Showing of prejudice
Whether, assuming an abuse of discretion, Gaston has shown

prejudice when he has failed to establish that any of the jurors who
were ultimately seated on his jury were partial or incompetent.

a.

Standard of review

The question whether Gaston has shown prejudice is unique to this
appeal, and a determination to be made by this Court. As such, there
is no standard of review.

b.

Preservation of issue

Gaston raised this issue in his Opening Brief.

1/iP

3
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 7 provides in relevant part:

RULE 47.

JURORS

****
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to

a particular juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The
juror challenged and any other person may be examined as a witness on
the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on
one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may
remove a juror upon the same grounds.
(f)(l) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render
a person competent as a juror.

****
(f)(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that
reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act
impartially. No person may serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the
judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly.
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f).

4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment on a special verdict after a jury
trial.

R. 601-04. Gaston sued the District seeking damages for

injuries he suffered when he struck a cable stretched across a parking
lot entrance at Ensign Elementary School. R. 1-6. The District denied
~

liability, and asserted that it owed Gaston no duty of care and that any
injury or damage sustained by him was caused by his own fault.

~

R. 16-

18, 54-57.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On November 5, 2013, Gaston filed his complaint against the
District, asserting a negligence claim. R. 1-6. The district court
conducted a jury trial from September 13 to 15, 2016. R. 525-28, 56869. After the conclusion of the trial, on September 15, 2016, the jury
returned a special verdict finding that Gaston was 55% at fault and
that the District was 45% at fault.

R. 566-67. On October 7, 2016, the

district court entered judgment on the special verdict in favor of the
5
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District and against Gaston. R. 613-15.

Gaston timely appealed on

October 25, 2016. R. 619.

Statement of Facts

The Accident at Ensign Elementary School
At approximately midnight on Saturday, August 18, 2012, Gaston
left a party and was walking a friend's dog across the street from
Ensign Elementary School. R. 2, 267.

Gaston let the dog off the leash.

R. 268. The dog ran onto the school grounds at the westernmost
entrance to the school's parking lot. R. 269. Gaston chased after the
dog and ran into a cable that was stretched across that parking lot
entrance. R. 270. Posted at that parking lot entrance, and elsewhere
on school grounds, were signs directing, "NO DOGS ON SCHOOL
PROPERTY." See, e.g., R. 278.
Gaston knew the area and had been by the westernmost entrance
to the school's parking lot "many times'' before the incident. R. 272,
361. There are two yellow posts, one on each side of the parking lot
entrance. R. 359. Before the accident, Gaston knew that there was a
cable attached to the posts, and he had seen the cable stretched across
6
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the parking lot entrance about half of the time.

R. 291, 360.

According to Gaston, it was "equally possible" for the cable to be up as it
~

was to be down. R. 363.

Voir Dire
The district court conducted a jury trial from September 13 to 15,
2016. R. 525-28, 568-69.
vJ

Of the anticipated 40-person venire panel,

26 prospective jurors showed up.

R. 772- 73.

During voir dire, the district court, on its own motion, excused two
prospective jurors for cause. R. 663, 739. Gaston moved to strike 10
prospective jurors for cause. R. 681, 692, 697, 705, 708, 717, 728, 744,
757, 758. Of Gaston's 10 for-cause challenges, the district court
granted five, see R. 693, 706, 729, 7 45, 758, and denied five, see R. 681,
698, 710, 718, 759. Specifically, the district court denied Gaston's forcause challenges to the following prospective jurors:
• Prospective juror number 11, Kyle, see R. 674-48, 681,772;
• Prospective juror number 12, John, see R. 822-27, 772;
• Prospective juror number 19, Katie, see R. 846-51, 772;
v;

7
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Gt)

• Prospective juror number 24, Lyle, see R. 858-63, 773; and
• Prospective juror number 37, Debbie, see 753-57, 758-59, 773. 1

Kyle
Kyle is a full-time student. R. 816. During jury selection, Kyle
testified that he is a newlywed and in the process of buying a house. R.
675. He explained that the loan process has tight deadlines and
expressed concern about being able to timely respond to the demands of
his loan processor. Id.
When asked whether he held negative thoughts or feelings
towards individuals who file lawsuits, Kyle testified that his uncle is a
lawyer, who sometimes "sees cases that he doesn't believe should be
cases," where "that person is trying to sue just ... to get money out of a
big company[.]" R. 676-77. When asked to identify factors that might
make him feel negatively about persons filing suit, Kyle initially

In his Opening Brief, Gaston refers to the challenged prospective
jurors by their first names- i.e., Kyle, John, Katie, Lyle, and Debbie.
For ease of reference and to avoid confusion, the District, too, will refer
to the challenged prospective jurors by their first names.
1

8
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responded that he "didn't really have a good example," but then stated,
"if they are trying to like make things bigger than they are ... and just
~

trying to blow things out of proportion[.]" R. 677. Kyle also clarified
that ''if somebody was irresponsible in what they did and there was
damage done or [ifj somebody ... should have done something better,
then I think that's perfectly okay for someone to sue[.]" Id.

~

With respect to Kyle's concerns about his schedule and the
demands of his loan process, the district court followed up by asking
Kyle whether, if required to "stay and serve," he would "be able to sit
and focus and pay attention and listen to this trial." R. 677-78. Kyle
responded, "[y]es." R. 678.
When the district court asked whether the parties would pass or
challenge Kyle, Gaston's counsel, Ms. Keundig, stated, "Your Honor, if
you're comfortable. You know, my only concern is that [Kyle] is
preoccupied." R. 678. When pressed whether Gaston "was going to

~

make a challenge," his counsel said, "Yes, your honor, just because I
worry that he's going to be preoccupied ... so that would be my reason."
R. 681. The District's counsel expressed concern about the "small
9
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group" of venirepersons and that "bouncing too many here for cause,
[could] create a problem." Id.
The district court denied the challenge for cause, noting that,
when "flat out asked whether he could pay attention to the evidence,
[Kyle] said yes." Id.

The district court continued, stating, "we all

have little things going on, little hardships, but this one doesn't seem to
rise to the level of impeding Kyle's ability to listen to the evidence and
give the trial his full attention." Id.

John
John works in sales, and as a bus driver for the Jordan School
District. R. 680, 822. His wife had also worked as a teacher for
Jordan School District. R. 680, 822. During voir dire, Gaston's
counsel asked John, "So because of your employment, your wife's former
employment, would that cause you to have any concerns about your
ability to be fair and impartial when one of the parties to this case is a
school district?" John replied, "I doubt it." R. 680.
Gaston's counsel also questioned John about his opinion
concerning whether there are too many lawsuits and whether people
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are too eager to sue. John responded, "I just think that there's a lot of
situations out there that people are sue happy and tend to think that
people should be a little more responsible." R. 678-79. Then, when
asked whether his stated opinion would impact his view of evidence in a
case, John responded, "I don't know if it would. It just depends on the
evidence. I think that if there's evidence that there's something wrong
~

then (inaudible)." R. 679.
Gaston's counsel also discussed different burdens of proof-i.e., the
"very high" "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which "we all hear a

VP

lot about on the TV [crime] shows"; and the "lower" "preponderance of
the evidence" standard applicable "in this case." R. 679. Gaston's
counsel then asked John if "there is a chance that you" would have "a
hard time applying that lower burden of proof in this case[.]" Id.
VP

John responded, "Could be." R. 680.
Gaston's counsel moved to strike John on the basis that, "even
though the law is the preponderance of the evidence, he can't say for
certain whether he would be able to apply that standard[.]" R. 681.
The District's counsel responded, "I think that he didn't understand," R.
11
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681, and further stated, "if the preponderance of the evidence standard
is the issue, let's have him come back and have [the court] read the
instruction to him and have him answer" whether he would follow the
instruction. R. 682.
The district court called John back for further examination. R.
685, 706. Upon John's return, the district court inquired whether he
had "any concerns about [his] ability to understand the [preponderance
of the evidence] standard." R. 707. John responded, "What is
preponderance of the evidence?" Id.

The district court noted "that is a

great question," and then proceeded to read the entire preponderance of
the evidence instruction to John. R. 707-08. Thereafter, the district
court asked, "So does that instruction make sense to you and can you
follow it when I give it to you as applied in this case." R. 708. John
responded, "I could." Id.

The district court followed up, asking, "Do

you have any questions about the instruction?" Id.

John said he had

"[n]o questions." Id.
When the district court asked whether there was still a challenge,
Gaston's counsel said, "I do still have the challenge just because of those
12
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really long pauses." Id.

Counsel expressed concerns that the pauses

could indicate continued confusion by John about the preponderance of
the evidence standard, and questioned John's ability to apply that
standard. R. 708-09. The District's counsel did not share the same
concerns and stated that, to him, "the pauses reflect[ed] a thoughtful
individual [who] was considering his answers." R. 710.
The district court denied the challenge for cause, stating, "I don't
think I can strike a juror four [sic] cause based on pauses." Id.

The

district court further stated, "[John] said he would follow the
instruction. I read it to him in its entirety. He didn't have any
questions about it." Id.

Katie
Katie is an elementary school teacher in Sandy, Utah. R. 693.
During jury selection, Gaston's counsel asked Katie whether she had
any concerns-because of her employment and involvement in the
education system-about her ability to be fair and impartial, given that
one of the parties is a school district.

R. 693. Katie responded,

"maybe a little." Id.
13
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Thereafter, the district court described the nature of the case to
Katie, explaining that it "doesn't involve any individual member or
employee of the school district being sued," and that ''[i]t's a suit against
the school district generally claiming that the district itself was
negligent in the way that it maintained the grounds of the school." R.
694. The district court then asked Katie whether, knowing that the
suit was against a district, and not a teacher, she would "have any
trouble sitting fairly and deciding this case." Id.
don't think so.

Katie responded, "I

I don't think I'd be biased." Id.

In her questionnaire responses, Katie indicated that, if supported
by the evidence, she could award money for all types of damages (i.e.,
medical expenses, lost opportunity for wages, mental and physical pain
and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life). R. 848.

Gaston's counsel

questioned Katie about one of her responses to the jury questionnaire,
indicating that there would be a limit to the amount of money she was
willing to award a plaintiff. R. 694; see also R. 849. Katie responded,
"Well, I think like how much money I guess it depends on what
happened." R. 694.
14
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Gj

When Gaston's counsel asked Katie whether she "would be
uncomfortable and have a bias against awarding any money for
something like loss of enjoyment of life," Katie responded, "No, well, I
guess it depends on the circumstances." R. 695. When pressed
further about whether "there are situations where you think you would
award money for loss of enjoyment of life," R. 695, Katie responded,
"Yeah, if it was ... like a totally random accident or something like a
ceiling grid fell on your head, you know what I mean." R. 695. Katie
then explained that something like that had happened to her sister at
work. Id.

"Something fell on her head and she's had, you know,

injuries since and she hasn't gotten any payment, like nothing, so I
li>

think maybe that's unfair." Id.
Gaston's counsel also asked Katie whether "there [is] a limit to the
amount of money you would be willing to award a plaintiff against a
school district." R. 696. Katie responded, "I mean there's got to be a
limit. You can't say like I want $10 million, you know what I mean?
It's got to be fair."

Id. Katie added, "[Y]ou can't just say I think I

deserve $2 million for that if it's not worth that, you know what I mean?
15
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If the medical bills or payments (inaudible) were [$] 20,000, you

shouldn't be asking for a million dollars because you just want some
extra money." R. 696.
During voir dire questioning, Katie did express concerns about
school funding and being a teacher, stating, "we need so much more
money as teachers to meet the needs of the kids. So I feel like if the
school district is having to pay all this money to other things or more
than they need to be paying, then it's going to hurt the kids." R. 697.
At the end of the questioning, Gaston's counsel moved to strike
Katie for cause "because she's a teacher" and "would have a hard time
awarding money damages against a school district[.]" R. 697 ~98.
Counsel continued, stating, "[Katie] really couldn't feel that she could
award money for loss of enjoyment of life," "unless it was an absolutely
random accident." R.

698.

The District's counsel disagreed with the characterization of
Katie's testimony, stating, "What I heard her say was depending on the
circumstances, she could award damages." Id.

Counsel further
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stated, "I think the mere fact that she's a teacher isn't grounds for
disqualification." Id.
The district court denied the challenge for cause, stating that
although Katie "did express some concerns about large judgments," "it
seemed to be large judgment in the abstract." R. 698. The court
continued, stating that "when asked, [Katie] said really what she thinks
\/JP

is that they need to be fair." Id.

"And I heard her say that ... she's

only worried if the school district has to pay more than [it] need[s] to be
paying." Id.

The district court then reasoned, "Based on those

statements and the example she gave about her sister who had been
injured and had never been paid out, I think she can sit fairly in this
case." Id.

Lyle
Lyle testified that during the day he works at Intermountain
Farmers Association ("IFA"), located in Draper, Utah, which is across
the street from the Draper City building. At IFA, Lyle drives trucks,
and processes and makes feed for animals. R. 711, 858. He also
works as a custodian in the facilities department at the Draper City
17
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building, where he takes care of the grounds, clears the walkways of
snow in the winter, and cleans up trash, debris, and leaves in the fall
and spring. R. 711. Lyle further testified that, at his Draper City

~

building job, he is not involved in any way in making decisions about
the layout of, or security for, the grounds, and he has no responsibility

~

for putting up gates or locking up a parking lot. R. 712-13.
At his IFA job, Lyle does put a couple of safety chains up across
the truck pit "so people don't go through [the] pit or the drain falls." R.
713. Those safety chains are about 10 feet long with a visible metal
piece hanging on them. Id.

Ly le testified that he is not involved in

any way in deciding what type of chain or barrier to put up; his
responsibilities are limited to simply implementing measures that

~

another department has decided should be in place. R. 714.
With respect to his experience with chains, the district court
followed up and asked Lyle whether, if selected as a juror, he could "put
aside things that [he has] heard at work" and "decide this case solely on
the evidence that he hear[s] in the courtroom here today without regard
to [his] experience securing the areas that [he has] at work." R. 715.
18
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Cilll

Lyle answered, "I think I could." Id.

The district court inquired

further, asking Lyle, ''So if somebody in this courtroom comes in and
says something that disagrees with what you've heard from the safety
team at work, ... can [you] give that weight without letting what you
hear at work effect you?" Id.

Ly le responded, "[y]es." Id.

Next, Gaston's counsel questioned Lyle about his jury
questionnaire response indicating that there would be a limit to the
amount of money he would be willing to award a plaintiff. R. 715. In
response, Lyle testified that he hadn't "really thought about [a] limit on
that," but that "some things ... could just be extraordinary." Id.

Lyle

continued, "I think over-extraordinary amounts," and that it "depends
on the amount of damage to the person or something like that." Id.
Lyle further explained, "[I have] [n]ever been involved in a case really
in deciding that so I just don't know." R. 716.
Asked whether knowing that the case involves Gaston and a
school district would tip the scales of justice in favor of one party, id.,
Lyle responded that, "going in," he would view the parties "equally." R.
717.
19
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Gaston's counsel moved to strike Lyle for cause "[b]ecause of what
he does and the fact that he has prior experience with very similar
chains or cables." Id.

Counsel expressed concern that Lyle would

"view the evidence in a prejudicial way," and "share [that view] with
other jurors in deliberation." Id.

Gaston's counsel also articulated, as

a second ground for the for-cause challenge, Lyle's response to the jury
questionnaire indicating "that there were limits" to what he was willing
to a ward a plaintiff in a civil action. Id.
The District's counsel responded, disputing that "[t]he fact that
[Lyle] may have experience with a cable or chain" constitutes "a basis
for cause." R. 717-18.

Counsel explained that "if we use that

standard, anybody [who] drives a motor vehicle would be excluded" from
cases involving motor vehicles accidents "because [of their] experience
with motor vehicles." R. 718. One "could extend [that rationale] to
almost anything." Id.
The district court denied the challenge for cause, stating that
"[Lyle's] experience with the cable and/or chain in his work is very
different from the issue in this case" because "his work is not a public
20
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place" or "a place where people go recreationally[.]" R. 718. The court
continued, stating that Lyle works at "a private business," and the
chain used "secures what is actually a dangerous area." Id.

Lastly,

the district court noted that Lyle affirmatively indicated that "he could
put all of that aside and rely simply on [the evidence] given here in
court." Id.

Debbie
Debbie is a 59-year-old mother of four adult children. R. 912.
Her father was "a tough World War II navy man," who taught and
expected his children "to be a little tough like the military is." R. 754.
Once, when injured, Debbie "just toughed it out." R. 754. "That's
what [her family] did." Id.

When asked by Gaston's counsel whether

her upbringing would preclude her from "award[ing] money to
somebody for pain and suffering if the evidence demonstrated that there
had been pain and suffering," Debbie responded, "If the evidence
0jj

according to the law demonstrated that, I would be able to have an open
mind[.]" R. 755.
Next, Gaston's counsel asked Debbie about her jury questionnaire
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response indicating that there would be a limit to the amount of money
she would be willing to award a plaintiff in a civil case. R. 755, see also
R. 915. Debbie indicated a potential issue with damages for pain and
suffering, and stated: "[A]s far as pain and suffering, we were taught
that when you were ill, you went into your room and when you were
finished you came out," so "there would be a little bit of that influence
for me as far as finances go and as far as a cap on money." R. 756. "I
would be very conservative when it comes to that." R. 756.
Next, when asked whether being conservative "would impact [her]
ability to be fair and impartial," Debbie responded, "I don't think that it
would." R. 756. Debbie then explained that, having lived overseas for
10 years, "I know what a wonderful country the United States is[,] and I
believe in being fair and impartial and hearing all of the evidence[.]"

Id. In addition, when asked, Debbie stated that the fact that the
defendant was a school district would not impact her ability to be fair
and impartial. Id.
Thereafter, the district court followed up with Debbie on the issue
of damages for pain and suffering. The court asked Debbie whether, if
22
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selected as a juror, she could follow the court's instruction that, upon a
finding of fault, "the law entitles the plaintiff to certain kinds of
damages including compensation for ... pain and suffering." R. 75657. Debbie responded, "If it's under the law, I would follow the law."
R. 757.

Gaston's counsel moved to strike Debbie for cause, arguing "that
1,/j

her upbringing would make it difficult for her to see why someone
necessarily would be entitled to damages for pain and suffering." R.
758. Gaston's counsel noted that Debbie had referenced "her age." Id.
The District's counsel responded to the objection, stating that
although "[Debbie] did say she would be conservative," she also said
"that she would be fair and impartial" and would follow the court's
instructions. R. 759.
The district court denied the challenge for cause, stating that
unlike another prospective juror (Juror No. 36), who "waffled'' about her
ability to award damages, "[Debbie] was very affirmative in the fact
that she would follow the law." R. 759. The court further stated that
although Debbie was "raised in a way'' that taught her to "bite down on
23
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the stick and get through it," that notion "strikes me more as just sort of
being responsible for your actions." Id.

The court noted that "if

[Debbie] found the school district had really been negligent, ... she
would hold them accountable." Id.

Gaston's renewed challenges for cause
After questioning all the prospective jurors, and before proceeding
to the parties' peremptory challenges, Gaston's counsel wanted to read
into the record portions of the advisory comments to Rule 47 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that "[i]t is not the judge's duty to seat
a jury from a too small venire panel" or to '"rehabilitate' a juror." R.
761. Gaston's counsel then renewed the for-cause challenges to Lyle,

see R. 761-62, Katie, see R. 762, and Debbie, see R. 763. In the latter,
Gaston's counsel noted that "[Debbie's] 60 years old" and has "60 years
of upbringing" teaching her to "tough it out." R. 763.
In response to the renewed challenges, the district court
responded, "You realize we're not having a trial if I grant those
[renewed challenges] or [unless] you waive your eight Lluror panel] or
you waive your peremptories?" Id.

Gaston's counsel replied, "Yes,
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your Honor.

I'm aware." Id.

The district court addressed Gaston's renewed challenges and
then stated, "We've struck a balance here and I think we've struck the
correct balance under Rule 47[,] so ... the denials to those challenges
will stand as they are." R. 765.

Peremptory challenges and the jury
that was seated and deliberated
~

Each party was allowed four peremptory challenges. 2 R. 760,
772- 73. Gaston used peremptory challenges to excuse, among others,
prospective jurors Katie and Lyle.

Neither party challenged the way

the other party exercised its peremptory challenges. R. 769. Gaston
passed on the jury, subject to the challenges he had made. R. 770.
Kyle and John were seated on the jury. R. 770, 772-73.
Debbie was designated as the alternate juror and did not end up
participating in the jury's deliberation and verdict. R.

772-73. 3

2

This is one more than the three peremptory challenges required by
rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 47(e) ("Each party shall be entitled to three
peremptory challenges.").
3 As the ninth juror seated, Debbie was designated as the alternate
25
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~

Special Verdict and Judgment
The jury's verdict was set forth in its answer to a special verdict
form, signed on September 15, 2016. R. 525, 566-67. The jury found
that Gaston was 55% at fault, and that the District was 45% at fault.

Id. On October 7, 2016, the district court entered judgment on the
special verdict in favor of the District and against Gaston. R. 613-15.

Cull

Juror.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The district court properly exercised its discretion in denying
Gaston's challenges for cause. The record shows that the district court
properly and thoroughly conducted a voir dire process that confirmed
that the jurors ultimately empaneled were capable and willing to hear
the case in a fair and impartial manner. Any potential biases that
~

Kyle, John, Katie, Lyle, or Debbie may have suggested during initial
questioning were merely the product of light impressions and were
clearly rebutted upon further examination by counsel and the district
court. There is no record evidence indicating that any of the five held
deep-rooted biases or prejudices that would close off their mind to the
testimony, or impede them from rendering a judgment fairly and
impartially, and in accordance with the district court's instructions and
the law.
Even if Gaston could establish an abuse of discretion in the district
court's rulings, he has failed to make the required showing of prejudice.
To begin, Gaston's claim that he was prejudiced by the mere fact that
27
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~

he was forced to use a peremptory challenge is foreclosed by the case
law, which makes clear that Gaston must show that a member of the
jury ultimately empaneled was partial or incompetent. Next, because

Wv

neither Katie, Lyle, nor Debbie were members of the jury that
deliberated and rendered the special verdict, Gaston's claim of prejudice
cannot be based on any of them. And finally, although Kyle and John
were members of the jury ultimately empaneled, Gaston cannot
establish prejudice based on either one of them. Gaston did not object
to Kyle or John on the grounds of bias or prejudice before the district
Citv

court, thus waiving any such argument on appeal. And, the case law
makes clear that neither Kyle's potential distraction due to personal
concerns nor John's initial confusion about the preponderance of the
evidence standard rendered them incompetent to serve as jurors.
The district court's judgment should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING GASTON'S CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE.
Standard of Review
A trial court is vested with "broad discretion" in determining

whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause to a prospective juror,

State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,

,r 20, 61 P.3d 1019; State v. Ellifritz, 835

P .2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), and its decision will be set aside
only when the record discloses a clear abuse of discretion.

Wach, 2001 UT 35,

,r 25,

State v.

24 P.3d 948. This deferential standard

recognizes the trial court's "advantaged position in determining which
persons would be fair and impartial jurors," id., and in assessing, by
personal observation, the prospective juror's attitude, demeanor, and
credibility in explaining his or her state of mind.
Moreover, "[u]nder this standard, [this Court] will not reverse the
trial court's ruling unless [the Court] find[s] that the ruling was beyond
reason." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86,
VP

,r 47, 55 P.3d 573 (citation
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omitted). "In [its] review, [this Court] 'look[s] to the entire voir dire
exchange with the challenged juror."' Id. (quoting State v. Lafferty,
2001 UT 19,

1 58, 20 P.3d 342); accord State v. Maestas,

2012 UT 46,

if

41, 299 P.3d 892 ("[W]hen reviewing the propriety of a denial or grant of
a challenge for cause, [the Court] look[s] to the entire voir dire exchange
with the challenged juror.").
"[U]nder Utah law, 'a per se reversible error does not occur
whenever a party is compelled to use a peremptory challenge to remove
a jury member that the trial court erroneously failed to remove for
cause."' Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I 41 (quoting Wach, 2001 UT 35,

accord State u. Sessions, 2012 UT App 273,

1 24);

il 24, 287 P.3d 497

("[P]rejudice will not be presumed" merely because "a party is compelled
to use a peremptory challenge on a panel member who should have been
removed for cause.").
"Instead, to prevail on a claim of error based on the court's failure
to remove a prospective juror, a defendant must demonstrate that (1)
the court erred when it failed to excuse a prospective juror for cause,

and (2) the error prejudiced the [party], or, in other words, that a
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(¼.,

~

member of the jury [ultimately empaneled] was partial or incompetent."

Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
0j

,r 41 (internal quotation omitted, emphasis in

original, brackets added); accord State v. Menzies, 889 P .2d 393, 398
(Utah 1994) ("To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to
remove a juror for cause, a [party] must demonstrate prejudice, viz.,
show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." (citation
omitted)). A claim of prejudice "must focus ... on the jury ultimately
seated."

Wach, 2001 UT 35,

1 36.

Presumption of Impartiality and Rebuttal
~

"[O]nce statements are made during voir dire that facially raise a
question of [a prospective juror's] partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or
unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the inference
rebutted." Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

1 43 (internal quotation omitted,

second bracket in original). '"Rebuttal is accomplished by showing that
a [prospective] juror's statement was merely the product of a light
impression and not one that would close the mind against testimony
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that may be offered in opposition."' Id. (quoting Wach, 201 UT 35,

1

27).

Discussion
A.

Gaston's general complaints about the venire
and voir dire have no merit.
~

Throughout his Opening Brief, Gaston gripes that the venire
panel was too small, and thus a "problem." See Opening Br. at pp. 5,
20, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48. He then attributes an "improper purpose" to the
district court's denials of his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors,
claiming the decisions were wholly motivated to avoid that "problem."

Id. at pp. 26, 36, 38, 39, 46-47. Gaston's argument should be rejected.
Before the district court, Gaston never objected to the venire panel
as being unacceptably small or as failing to represent a fair crosssection of the community.

Nor did he request that the court reschedule

the trial to a later date to get a larger venire panel. Instead, Gaston
elected to proceed.
Further, a court is presumed to act impartially, honestly, justly,
and within the bounds of its discretion in discharging its duties absent
32
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an affirmative showing to the contrary. Gaston has not made such a
showing. As set forth below, a review of the entire voir dire exchanges
with the challenged prospective jurors makes clear that the district
court properly exercised its discretion in denying Gaston's challenges
for cause.
Next, Gaston repeatedly notes that the District's counsel did not
v;J

ask any follow-up questions, see Opening Br. at 38, 39, 42, 44, and
claims that the District carries the burden to re but an inference of bias,
see id. at pp. 28, 35, 38. Gaston errs. The ca~e law makes clear that

further questioning may be conducted by counsel or the court to rebut
an inference of bias.

See Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

iJ 43 (once a

presumption of bias is raised, "an abuse of discretion occurs unless the
challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel
investigates further and finds the inference rebutted." (emphasis
added)).
The district court "is afforded broad discretion in conducting voir
dire" and seating an impartial jury. State v. Aluarez, 2014 UT App
179,

iJ 5, 332 P.3d 978. Here, the district court did not limit
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questioning by the parties' counsel, and afforded the parties adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors and
explore grounds for challenges for cause. As set forth below, when
inferences of bias did arise, they were rebutted by follow-up questions
from Gaston's counsel or further investigation by the district court.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with
the venire panel, in conducting voir dire, or in denying Gaston's
challenges for cause. The five for-cause challenges that Gaston
addresses on appeal are discussed, in turn, below.
B.

The district court properly denied Gaston's forcause challenge to prospective juror Kyle.

On appeal, Gaston argues that Kyle should have been excused for
cause based on a single ground (potential bias) that is completely
different than the ground he had asserted before the district court
(potential preoccupation). As set forth below, both arguments have
been waived and neither is winning.
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1.

Gaston's argument based on Kyle's potential
bias against plaintiffs generally has been
waived, and, in any event, has no merit.

Gaston contends that Kyle's responses to questions during voir
dire "suggest[ed] a bias against plaintiffs generally," and that Gaston
~

challenged Kyle for cause on that ground.

See Opening Br. at 35.

Gaston misstates the record. He did not raise a potential bias against
plaintiffs generally as a ground for his for-cause challenge of Kyle.
Instead, as the record makes clear, the "only concern" articulated by
Gaston was that Kyle may be "preoccupied."
THE COURT: Pass? Challenge?
MS. KEUNDIG: Your Honor, if you're comfortable. You
know my only concern is that he's preoccupied. We've
all been in that situation, so I'm a little sympathetic to him.

****
THE COURT: All right. Let's go back to Kyle real quick.
Are you going to make a challenge?
MS. KUENDIG: Yes, your Honor, just because I worry
that he's going to be preoccupied. You know I'd
probably be wanting to check my email every hour if I was
worried about losing a house as a newlywed so that would be
my reason.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: Yeah.

Okay. Mr. Lott.

MR. LOTT: My only concern is we've got such a small
group that if we bounce too many here for cause, it may
create a problem.
THE COURT: Yeah, I agree. You know I asked him flat
out at the end whether he could pay attention to the
evidence. He said yes. You know we all have little things
like that going on, little hardships, but this one doesn't seem
to rise to the level of impeding his ability to sit and listen to
the evidence and give the trial his full attention, so I'm going
to deny the challenge for cause.
R.

Gl;.;

678, 681 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "the grounds for an

objection must be specifically and distinctly stated," and that "[f]ailure
to meet these requirements precludes review of [the party's] claim on
appeal." State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) (defendant
waived claim that trial court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse
prospective juror because of his prior experience in law enforcement by
failing to seek his removal on that ground). See also, generally, State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 20 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.").
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~

Here, Gaston did not object to or challenge Kyle on the ground of
any perceived bias before the district court. Accordingly, Gaston's
argument based on Kyle's potential bias is waived. 4
Waiver aside, the record makes clear that any initial inference of
bias by Kyle against "plaintiffs' generally" was rebutted.
MS. KEUNDIG. ***You did say that you have negative
thoughts or feelings towards someone that files a lawsuit.
Can you tell us what you mean by that or why you hold that
belief?

vj

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KYLE]: I just feel like -- my uncle
is a lawyer and sometimes he sees cases that he doesn't
believe should be cases, that the person is trying to sue for -to get money out of a big company or something and when I
see stuff like that, I don't necessarily agree with the case so,
yeah. That's it~
MS. KEUNDIG: So, I guess what I would be curious about
is how do you decide? What kind of facts or factors make
you feel that somebody -- have a negative feeling toward
somebody that filed a lawsuit?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KYLE]: If it's something that I
would consider that wouldn't be an issue like - I'm trying to
think of a good example. I don't really have a good example

In addition, Gaston did not renew his challenges to Kyle or John at the
end of the prospective-juror questioning, but objected again only to Lyle,
Katie, and Debbie. See R. 761-63.
4
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~

right now, but if it's just something that - I don't know. I
guess it comes with a gut feeling like if somebody was
irresponsible in what they did and there was damage
done or somebody that should have done something
better, then I think that's perfectly okay for someone
to sue, but if they are trying to like make things
bigger than they are -

MS. KUENDIG: Uh-huh.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KYLE]: - and just trying to
blow things out of proportion, that that would be a
fact.
R.

676-77 (emphasis added).
The district court had the opportunity to hear Ky le as he testified,

observe his attitude and demeanor, and evaluate his sincerity and
capacity for fairness and impartiality. The voir dire questioning made
clear that Kyle did not hold any deep-rooted bias or prejudice against
plaintiffs generally, the subject matter of the litigation, or Gaston
personally that would impede his ability to hear or consider opposing
testimony.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Gaston's motion to strike Kyle.
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~

2.

Gaston's for-cause challenge of Kyle based
on his potential preoccupation has also
been waived, and, in any event, has no
merit.

Before the district court, Gaston moved to strike Kyle because of
concerns of his potential preoccupation. R. 678, 681. But, in his
Opening Brief, Gaston does not argue that Kyle was unduly preoccupied
by the purchase and financing of a new home, or that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Gaston's for-cause challenge on that
ground.

See Opening Br. at pp. 35-38. 5 Nor does Gaston argue that

the district court abused its discretion in failing to excuse Ky le based on
"undue hardship," as provided under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-109.
Accordingly, any argument based on Kyle's potential preoccupation has
been waived, and this Court need not tarry over it.
Glover, 2000 UT 89,

See Brown v.

,r 23, 16 P.3d 540 (issues "not presented in the

[appellant's] opening brief are considered waived and will not be

IJ

Although Gaston does reference "Kyle's clearly understandable
preoccupation with a pending home sale," Opening Br. at p. 37, he does
not argue on appeal that Kyle should have been excused on that ground.

5
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considered by the appellate court").
Further, even if not waived, Gaston's argument based on
preoccupation should be rejected.

Indeed, this Court has rejected a

similar argument in State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 825 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), aff'd, 908 P .2d 856 (Utah 1995) 6 (rejecting claim that prospective
juror's scheduling conflict diverted his full attention from the trial and
rendered him incompetent and unable to serve impartially).

As this

Court in Brooks explained:
Defendant claims ... that since [prospective juror] Barber
may have been distracted, he was unable to serve
impartially. This argument is without merit. * * *
All Mr. Barber indicated was that he had a scheduling
conflict that might demand some of his attention.
If the question were answered forthrightly, many
prospective jurors would probably admit that something in
their personal lives could cause them to divert some of their
attention from the trial. Such distractions, however, do not

6 Westlaw shows the Brooks case with a red flag and the explanation,
"[o]verruling [r]ecognized by Mulder v. State," 2016 UT App 297, 385
P.3d 708. A review of the Mulder case reveals that the opinion
mistakenly cites the subsequent history of Brooks as "overruled on other
grounds, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995)." However, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed Brooks. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858, 862
(Utah 1995). The point of law for which we cite Brooks was not
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in its decision.
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rise to the level of a challenge for cause.

Id. (footnote omitted).
The slight inconvenience related to sitting on a jury is not a
sufficient ground for dismissal for cause.

To be sure, almost every

prospective juror is inconvenienced by taking time away from work,
family, or his or her normal routine.

And each prospective juror has

his or her own personal concerns, which could cause some distraction
from a trial.
Moreover, Kyle never indicated that he would be too busy or
distracted to perform his duties as a juror, or that he would be
preoccupied to the extent that it would preclude him from listening to
the evidence or deliberating in a fair and impartial manner.

To the

contrary, Kyle assured the district court that, if selected to serve, he
would be able to focus on the proceedings and evidence presented.
THE COURT: Kyle, I appreciate your circumstances.
We've all been young and in school and whatnot. There's a
possibility that I may listen to your plight and then decide
I'm going to make you stay and serve anyway. If I do that,

vi)
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will you be able to sit and focus and pay attention and listen
to this trial?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KYLE]: Yes.
R. 677-78.

Gaston's suggestion that the district court's questioning of Kyle
was "borderline coercive," Opening Br. at p. 37, should be rejected. A
court is presumed to act with proper motives, and there is simply no
evidence in the record that the district court applied undue pressure on
Ky le or engaged in coercive rehabilitation. The district court simply
asked Kyle whether-if selected to serve-he would be able to focus on
the trial and listen to the evidence. Kyle, without hesitation, indicated
that he could and would.
Gaston's related argument that Kyle's response to the court's
question was an improper "self-qualifying answer," Opening Br. at 38,
should be rejected.

Gaston cites no authority for the proposition that a

prospective juror is incapable of assessing the demands of his out-ofcourt schedule and obligations, or his ability and willingness to sit, pay
attention, and focus on the proceedings. Moreover, the
42
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district court was fully capable of observing Kyle's attitude and
demeanor, and assessing the sincerity of his response.
Plainly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Gaston's motion to strike Kyle on the ground that he may be
preoccupied.

C.

The district court properly denied Gaston's forcause challenge to prospective juror John.

In his opening brief, Gaston asserts two grounds for why John
should have been excused for cause: (1) potential bias; and (2) his
perceived inability to understand and apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard. See Opening Br. at p. 38. The first ground has
been waived, and neither ground is persuasive.
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Gaston's argument based on John's
potential bias against plaintiffs generally
has been waived, and, in any event, has no
merit.
Gaston contends that John's responses to voir dire questions
indicated a "bias against plaintiffs generally," Opening Br. at 38, and
then Gaston leads this Court to believe that he raised this potential
bias as a ground for his for-cause challenge to John. See id. at 38-39.
But Gaston did not raise before the district court John's potential bias
against plaintiffs as a ground for striking him for cause. Instead, the
record makes clear that the only objection articulated by Gaston was
based on John's perceived difficulty with understanding and applying
the preponderance of the evidence standard.
THE COURT:

* * * And what about John? Any challenge?

MS. KEUNDIG: Your honor, I would move to strike Juror
No. 12 for cause. He indicated that he just cannot, even
though the law is preponderance of the evidence, he can't say
for certain that he would be able to apply that standard as
instructed by the Court.
R. 681.
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As set forth above, it is well settled that, in order to preserve for
appellate review a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror, counsel
must contemporaneously state the reason for the challenge in distinct
and specific terms.

Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126. Here, Gaston did not

object to or challenge John in the district court on the ground of any
perceived bias. Accordingly, Gaston's argument based on John's
~

potential bias is waived.

See id. (defendant waived for-cause challenge

to prospective juror on ground not raised before the trial court); see also
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

il 11 ("claims not raised before the trial court may

not be raised on appeal").
Notwithstanding waiver, the record makes clear that any initial
inference of bias by John against plaintiffs generally was the product of
a "light impression" and not one that would close his mind against
testimony offered in opposition.
MS. KEUNDIG: I've just got a few quick questions for you.
You've indicated that you feel strongly that there are too
many lawsuits and people are too eager to sue. Can you tell
us a little about those beliefs that you hold?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [JOHN]: Oh, just relationships I
have and friendships. I just think that there's a lot of
45
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situations out there that people are sue happy and tend to
think that people should be a little bit more responsible.
MS. KEUNDIG: Okay. So how does that belief that you
hold impact the way that you view evidence in this case, if it
would?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [JOHN]: I don't know if it would.
It just depends on the evidence. I think that if there's
evidence that there's something wrong then (inaudible).

R. 678-79.
Gaston's complaint that "John never testified or otherwise
indicated that his view regarding tort plaintiffs were merely 'light
impressions,"' Opening Br. at 38-39, is curious given Gaston's argument
that a determination of John's impartiality cannot be based solely on a
"self-qualifying answer." Id. at 39.
And the district court did not rely solely on John's own assessment
of his impartiality. Gaston admits, as he must, that no such selfassessment was made by John. Id. at 38-39. Neither the district
court nor counsel asked, "John, yes or no, are you impartial?" Rather,
the district court, through personal observation, assessed John's
responses to all the voir dire questioning, as well as his attitude,
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~

demeanor, and credibility in explaining his state of mind. As there
were no testimonial facts in the record suggesting that John had an
impression so strong and deep as to constitute bias, refusing to strike
John for cause was a proper exercise of the district court's discretion.
2.

Gaston's for-cause challenge to John, based
on his perceived inability to apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard,
should be rejected.

The district court properly rejected Gaston's for-cause challenge to
John, which was based on Gaston's concern that John didn't understand
and wouldn't follow the preponderance of the evidence standard. See
R. 681-82, 708-09, 710. Gaston's argument that the district court
abused its discretion on this point, see Opening Br. at pp. 38-39, is
foreclosed by the case law and the record.
To begin, "[i]t is common for prospective jurors to be unaware of
the rules and presumptions of the law." State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d
459, 462 (Utah 1989), abrogated on other grounds by, State v. Doporto,
935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). In Gotschall, the Utah Supreme Court
found no abuse of discretion where the district court refused to dismiss
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a prospective juror who "was simply ignorant of the legal concept of
burden of proof until the judge clarified the matter."

Gotschall, 782

P.2d at 462. 7
As the Utah Supreme Court in Gotschall explained:
Every expression by a prospective juror that might be
inconsistent with the correct legal standard ... is not
grounds for a dismissal for cause. If the juror simply
misapprehends the appropriate standard but readily accepts
the correct standard when advised of it, it is hard to see how
that juror's state of mind ... will prevent him [or her] from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights [of a party].

Id. at 462 (internal quotation and citations omitted). "As long as a
potential juror is willing to be able to apply the rules of law once he or
she has been informed of them, that juror need not be dismissed for
cause." Id.
Here, John-like the prospective juror in Gotschall-"was simply
ignorant of the legal concept of burden of proof until the judge clarified

See also State v. Wilson, 771 P.2d 1077, 1083-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying request to
excuse prospective juror who expressed confusion about the appropriate
burden of proof).
7
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the matter." Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 462. After Gaston objected to
John's confusion concerning the preponderance of the evidence
~

standard, R. 681, the district court called John back for further
questioning on the issue, and read him the entire preponderance of the
0j

evidence instruction. R. 706-08. Thereafter, the following colloquy
took place:
THE COURT: * * * So that's kind of the best description of
preponderance of the evidence that all of the lawyers and
judges in the world have been able to come up with. So does
that instruction make sense to you and can you follow it
when I give it to you as applied in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [JOHN]: I could.
THE COURT:
instruction?

Okay. Do you have any questions about the

PROSPECTIVE JUROR [JOHN]: No questions.
R. 708.

Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
rejecting Gaston's renewed argument suggesting that John's "long
pauses" in his responses were evidence of his continued inability to
understand or apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. R.
49
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708-10. As the District's counsel aptly pointed out, "the pauses reflect
a thoughtful individual [who] was considering his answers." R. 710.
(a;;

The district court had the advantaged position of being able to
personally observe John's attitude and demeanor, and the sincerity and
credibility of his responses.
A review of John's entire voir dire examination makes clear that
the district court acted within its discretion in determining that he
could serve on the jury and in denying Gaston's motion to strike John
for cause.
D.

The district court properly denied Gaston's forcause challenge to prospective juror Katie.

Gaston contends that the district court's denial of his motion to
strike Katie for cause was "the most egregious abuse of discretion in
this case." Opening Br. at p. 40. But Gaston's emphatic use of a
superlative does make his argument any more meritorious or
convincing.

His argument is not supported by case law or the record.

Gaston articulated three grounds for striking Katie for cause: (1)
she is a teacher; (2) she expressed concern about awarding money
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damages against a school district; and (3) she was hesitant to award
money damages for loss of enjoyment of life.

See R. 697-98. Those

specific objections are addressed in turn.
First, Gaston cites no authority for the proposition that a
prospective juror is presumed to be biased merely because of her
employment status or ties to a particular profession. Case law points
to the opposite conclusion. In the context of criminal prosecutions,
courts have routinely rejected arguments that employment with, or ties
to, law enforcement, alone, justifies removal for cause. See Mulder v.

State, 2016 UT App 207,

,r 65,

385 P.3d 708 (rejecting argument that

prospective juror should have been removed for cause because she had
tried to secure employment with, and has a close friend in, the police
force); State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[B]oth
this court and the Utah Supreme Court have upheld denials of motions
to strike law enforcement personnel for cause when questioning on voir
dire dispels any suggestion of bias raised by the prospective juror's law
enforcement background.").
\/IP

Moreover, the record makes clear that any potential bias by Katie,
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by virtue of her being a teacher, was a ''light impression" and would not
close her mind to a fair consideration of the case. Although Katie
expressed ''a little" concern about being able to be fair and impartial
because one of the parties was a school district, given that she is a
teacher and "wouldn't want to be sued for something [she]-did," R. 693,

~

that initial uneasiness was rebutted. After the district court clarified
the nature of the case to Katie, the following discussion took place.
THE COURT: * * * So, knowing that, I mean, do you have would you have any trouble sitting fairly and deciding this
case knowing that it's not a teacher or employee, but rather
just a school district as a whole that is accused of being
negligent?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KATIE]: I don't think so. I don't
think I'd be biased.
R. 694.
Second, Gaston's complaint that Katie expressed concern that a
t.t.,

verdict against a school district may negatively impact funding for the
classroom, see Opening Br. at 39, provided no basis for excusing Katie
for cause. And his claim that "as a person concerned about the
financial condition of school districts, [Katie] very clearly had a 'dog in
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the fight,"' id. at 41, is absurd. Katie did not live in or work for the
District. Moreover, many Utahns share a concern about school funding
and adequate resources for school children. Katie's responses depicted
a general concern with excessive money damages, and not a refusal to
follow the law, consider the evidence, or award damages fairly.
When Gaston's counsel asked "if there is a limit to the amount of
money you would be willing to award a plaintuf against a school
district," Katie responded:
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KATIE]: ... I mean there's got to
be a limit. You can't say like I want 10 million, you know
what I mean. It's got to be fair.

***
It's got to meet the - you can't just say I think I deserve $2
million if it's not worth that, you know what I mean? If the
medical bills or payments (inaudible) were [$]20,000, you
shouldn't be asking for a million dollars because you just
want some extra money ....
R. 696.

Third, Gaston overstates Katie's reluctance to award noneconomic damages for loss of enjoyment of life. See Opening Br. at p.
~

39. Contrary to Gaston's suggestion that Katie had a closed mind and
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"could not and would not award non-economic damages for loss of
enjoyment of life," id., her voir dire testimony made clear that she could
and would award such damages, depending on the circumstances.
MS. KEUNDIG: ... [A]re you saying that you couldn't - that
there just - you would feel uncomfortable and have a bias
against awarding any money for something like loss of
enjoyment of life?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KATIE]: No, well, I guess it
depends on the circumstances.
MS. KEUNDIG: Okay. So there are situations where you
think you would award money damages for loss of enjoyment
of life?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [KATIE]: Yeah, if it was like yeah, if [it was] like a totally random accident or something
like a ceiling grid fell on your head, you know what I mean.
Like my sister had that at her work. Something fell on her
head and she's had, you know, injuries since and she hasn't
gotten any payment, like nothing, so I think maybe that's
unfair.

R: 695.

In addition to this testimony, Katie's responses to the jury

questionnaire clearly stated that she was willing to award all types of
damages if supported by the evidence. R. 848.
Furthermore, the suggestion that Katie's perceived difficulty with
the issue of damages for loss of enjoyment of life was unique to her, and
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therefore disqualifying, is not supported by the record. The district
court noted that some questions "were not worded terribly great," and
that "almost every juror" had a question about "what [is] the joy of life"
and "the loss of enjoyment of life." R. 764.
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Katie
would not follow the law or the district court's instructions, or that she
could not render a true verdict upon the evidence. As with all the
prospective jurors, the district court had the opportunity to observe
Katie's demeanor, and the way she answered questions, and the district
court determined that she was being honest and accurate in her
statements and could follow the law. R. 765.
0j

Based on the entirety of the voir dire exchange with Katie, the
district court properly determined that Katie could "sit fairly and hear
this case." R. 698. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the challenge for cause.
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E.

The district court properly denied Gaston's forcause challenge to prospective juror Lyle.

Gaston argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his for-cause challenge to Lyle because his testimony revealed
bias and prejudice. Specifically, Gaston argues that Lyle should have
been stricken for cause because (1) "he had already formed an opinion
regarding the use of chains to secure property and keep trespassers off
of property," 8 and (2) he held a "preconceived limit" to any award of
damages notwithstanding the evidence presented.

Opening Br. 42-43.

Gaston mischaracterizes the record.
First, although Lyle testified that, as part of his job at IFA, he
puts up a safety chain across the truck pit to prevent people from falling

(ky

in, and that he believes this safety measure "keep[s] people from danger
and keep[s] the company from being in trouble," R. 713, he also testified
~

Gaston's position that Lyle's prior use of a safety chain was evidence of
bias against Gaston is based on pure speculation. Lyle testified that
the chain that he had used had "a metal piece that's hanging on it so
people can see [it], R. 713-a safety feature not found on the cable used
by the District.
8
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that he is not "involved in any way in deciding what type of chain or
barrier to put around that enclosure." R. 714. Lyle's responsibilities
"are limited to simply implementing what measures another
department decides should be in place." Id.
Further, Lyle's testimony clearly demonstrated that,
notwithstanding his experience with a safety chain, he could keep an
open mind and evaluate evidence fairly and impartially.
THE COURT: Lyle, you may, if you're selected as a juror in
this case, hear some evidence that the security measures
that were used by the school district may in the opinion of
some people have been inappropriate or dangerous. Would
you be able to put aside things that you've heard at work,
opinions you've heard from people at work and decide this
case solely on the evidence that you hear in the courtroom
here today without regard to your experience securing the
areas that you have at work?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [LYLE]: I think I could.
THE COURT: Okay. So if somebody in this courtroom
comes in and says something that disagrees with what
you've heard from the safety team at work, you can give that
weight without letting what you hear at work effect [sic]
you?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [LYLE]: Yes.

R. 715.
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Second, with respect to the question whether "there's is a limit to
the amount of money that [he] would be willing to award a plaintiff in a
civil case," Lyle's testimony completely refutes Gaston's claim that Lyle
had a "preconceived" idea about damages limits, as well as any
suggestion that Lyle had a closed mind.
MS. KEUNDIG: Lyle, can I also ask you briefly about
limits. You indicated in your questionnaire that there's a
limit to the amount of money that you would be willing to
award a plaintiff in a civil case regardless of what the
evidence was. What is the limit or what are those limits?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [LYLE]: I haven't really thought
about [a] limit on that, but some things, I don't know, could
just be extraordinary - I think over-extraordinary amounts
or depends on the amount of damages to a person or
something like that. Never been involved in a case really in
deciding that so I just don't know.
R.

715-16.
In addition, when Gaston's counsel asked Lyle whether,

"pictur[ing] the scales of justice," he would start the case "viewing the
parties equally, [or] not equally[,] giving one or the other more of a
benefit of the doubt," R. 716, Lyle responded, "I think that would
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depend on the evidence as the story progressed and then, but going in
equally I would say yeah, equal." R. 71 7.
Lyle's voir dire testimony showed that he was not biased and
would be fair and impartial. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Gaston's motion to strike Lyle for cause.
F.

The district court properly denied Gaston's forcause challenge to prospective juror Debbie.

Before the district court, Gaston moved to strike Debbie "because
her upbringing would make it difficult for her to see why someone
necessarily would be entitled to damages for pain and suffering," and
because she indicated "there would be a limit [to] what ... she could
ever award for something like that[.]" R. 758. Gaston also referenced
"her age" three times to support his motion to strike for ca use. R. 758,
763. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gaston's
motion to strike Debbie on those grounds.
To begin, Utah law clearly prohibits excluding a qualified citizen
from jury service on account of her age. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1103 ("It is the policy of this state that ... [a] qualified citizen may not
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be excluded from jury service on the account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, occupation, disability or economic status."). The
district court correctly ignored Gaston's fixation on Debbie's age.
Next, Debbie's voir dire testimony makes unmistakably clear
that-notwithstanding the facts that she is conservative and that her
military father raised her family to "tough[] it out" when injured-she
would be fair and impartial, listen to the evidence, follow the law, and
keep an open mind when considering damages for pain and suffering.
MS. KEUNDIG: ... Do you feel that you would absolutely
not be able to award money to somebody for pain and
suffering if the evidence demonstrated that there had been
pain and suffering?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [DEBBIE]: If the evidence
according to the law demonstrated that, I would be able to
have an open mind ....

***
MS. KEUNDIG: Do you feel that in being conservative that
that would impact your ability to be fair and impartial?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [DEBBIE]: I don't think that it
would. I've lived ten years overseas and I know what a
wonderful country the United States is and I believe in being
fair and impartial and hearing all of the evidence, but there
is that side of our family that everyone kind of lives by.
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MS. KEUNDIG: Okay. What about - does the fact that
the defendant in this case, that [it is] a school district, does
that cause you any concern about your ability to be fair and
impartial?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [DEBBIE]:

No, it does not.

R. 755-56

Thereafter, the district court had the following exchange with
Debbie:
THE COURT: Debbie, if you're selected as a juror in this
trial, toward the end of the trial I'm going to instruct you
that if the jury finds fault in this case, that the law entitles
the plaintiff to certain kinds of damages including
compensation for what we call pain and suffering, general
damages.
Knowing that and that a person is entitled to those
damages under the law, if you were the plaintiff, would you
want yourself sitting on the jury.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [DEBBIE]: If it's under the law, I
would follow the law.
R.

757.

Based on the entire voir dire exchange with Debbie, the district
court-having heard Debbie's testimony, observed her responses, and
evaluated her credibility and the sincerity of her statements-properly
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determined that she would be fair and impartial, and follow the court's
instruction and the law. The district court plainly acted within the
bounds of its discretion in refusing to strike Debbie for cause.

II. GASTON HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE.
Under Utah law, in order "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based on
the failure to remove a juror for cause, a [party] must demonstrate
prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or
incompetent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. Gaston has failed to make
this required showing for several reasons.
To begin, the district court's failure to strike prospective jurors
Katie, Lyle, or Debbie did not prejudice Gaston. Katie did not sit on
the jury-she was the subject of Gaston's third peremptory challenge.
R. 772. Lyle did not sit on the jury-he was the subject of Gaston's
fourth peremptory challenge. R. 773. And Debbie was seated as an
alternate juror and did not participate in the deliberation or verdict.

See R. 772-73.
Gaston's assertion that he was prejudiced by the mere fact that he
was "forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror" who the
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district court refused to excuse for cause, Opening Br. at 50, must be
rejected. That is not the correct standard.

Utah law clearly holds

that prejudice is not presumed-and "per se reversible error does not
occur"-"whenever a party is compelled to use a peremptory challenge
to remove a [prospective juror] that the trial court erroneously failed to
remove for cause." Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
0P

,r 41 (quotation omitted).

Gaston must show that "a member of the jury [ultimately empaneled]
was partial or incompetent." Id.
Thus, Gaston's claim of prejudice rests with Kyle and John.9
Gaston did not raise a for-cause challenge before the district court on
any of the other prospective jurors who were ultimately seated on the
jury. And he does not argue in his opening brief that any of those other
jurors were partial or incompetent. As a result, any claim of prejudice
based on a juror other than Kyle or John is waived. See Holgate, 2000
UT 74,

,r 11, 20 P.3d 346 ("As a general rule,

claims not raised before

Tellingly, Gaston did not include Kyle or John in his renewed
challenges for cause. See R. 671-73.

9
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~

the trial court may not be raised on appeal."); Brown, 2000 UT 89,

,r 23

(issues "not presented in the [appellant's] opening brief are considered
. d") .
waive

Turning to Kyle and John, Gaston has failed to show prejudice.
As set forth above, Gaston did not object to Kyle or John on the grounds
of bias or partiality before the district court, see R. 678, 681-82, 708-09,
thus waiving any such argument on appeal.

,r 11.

See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

And the case law makes clear that neither Kyle's potential

distraction, nor John's initial confusion about the preponderance of the
evidence standard rendered them incompetent to serve as jurors. See

Brooks, 886 P.2d at 825 (rejecting claim that prospective juror's
potential distraction rendered him unable to serve impartially);
Gotschall, 782 P .2d at 462 (finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to
dismiss prospective juror who misapprehended the legal concept of
burden of proof until the court clarified the matter).
In sum, even if Gaston could establish that the district abused its
discretion in denying his for-cause challenges to John, Kyle, Katie, Lyle,
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and Debbie, he cannot establish prejudice. The judgment of the
district court should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION

The district court correctly exercised its sound discretion in
<iv

denying Gaston's for-cause challenges to five prospective jurors. None
of them had deep-rooted biases or prejudices that would impede their
ability to hear and consider opposing testimony, or render judgment
impartially and in accordance with the district court's instructions and
the law. The district court was in the best position to evaluate their
respective responses and demeanor, and it did not abuse its discretion
when denying Gaston's challenges for cause. And Gaston has failed to
demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice.
For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
Dated: August 14, 2017
Respectfully submitted,

JOSHUAD. DAVIDSON (6713)

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee,
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